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**HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF JOINT ARMY/MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS**

BY

Lieutenant Colonel John A. Keenan  
United States Marine Corps


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HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF JOINT ARMY/MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS

by

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# ABSTRACT

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Today the United States military has a greater emphasis on joint warfighting capability than at any time in its history. With the passage of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act and the publication of Joint Pub 1, jointness will become more and more important in the military. Fighting together as a joint force is not new. Specifically, the Army and the Marine Corps have fought together as a joint force since the 1830's. This paper looks at selected campaigns and wars to try to capture some of the problems and lessons learned from the past. This is not an exhaustive study of joint Army/Marine Corps operations. Rather it is an overview intended to give the reader an appreciation for the fact that the new emphasis on jointness is really a rediscovery of how we have fought in the past.

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## INTRODUCTION

'New Marine Chief Urges More Ties With Army', blared the headline in the September 30, 1991 edition of the Defense News. The article quotes the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Carl Mundy, as saying ' There has never been more serious intent among the Joint Chiefs of Staff or [regional commanders in chief] to [focus on joint operations] than today.'<sup>1</sup>

In today's American military there is a renewed emphasis on jointness and joint warfighting capabilities. The success of our Armed Forces in the Persian Gulf has been attributed to that emphasis. In the same article in the Defense News, retired Army General John Foss, who had previously headed the Army's Training and Doctrine Command, is quoted as saying; ' The deployment of Army forces and Marine divisions to the Persian Gulf war showed that the two can fight side by side....'<sup>2</sup>

It is the central thesis of this paper that Marines and Soldiers effectively fighting side by side is nothing new. The military history of the United States is replete with many examples of soldiers, and soldiers of the sea, campaigning together as a joint team.

As we rediscover joint operations it is worth an examination of the past in order to garner whatever lessons

learned that may be available to us from historical study. In this paper I will present an historical survey of selected joint Marine Corps/U.S. Army operations in World War I, World War II, Korea, and in the post- Vietnam era. By necessity we will only look at specific campaigns or battles in each of these conflicts. We will capture the common ground of success and use that as a guideline to avoid the pitfalls we may uncover in future joint Army/Marine combat operations. Vietnam has been excluded because it was a small unit war frequently fought in service unique areas of operation.

The paper will not cover, except tangentially, the roles and missions of the two Services. Those roles and missions intersect, and in the future, just as in the past, these complementary roles may find 'doggies' and 'jarheads' once again fighting side by side against a common enemy.

World War I was not, however, the first time that soldiers and Marines had fought together as part of a joint force.

In 1836, Colonel Archibald Henderson, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, offered the War Department a regiment of Marines to assist the Army in their campaign against hostile Seminole and Creek Indians in Florida and Georgia. When his offer was accepted, Henderson raised the regiment by stripping Marine guards from Naval Yards and took personal command. Legend has it that he hung a note on the Commandant's quarters at the Marine Barracks in Washington: "Gone to

fight indians, back when the war is over.' Henderson and his Marines fought under an Army Brigadier General named Thomas Jessup. Jessup found that the Marines proved to be an effective and disciplined force.

In 1847, the Marine Corps provided a regiment for service with Winfield Scott's army in his drive on Mexico City. It was during this war, in the Battle of Chapultapec, that 'Marines with Brigadier General John A. Quitman, USA, made the identification of the 'Halls of the Montezumas' with the Corps a permanent thing.'"

A short time later Marines again were called upon to provide troops to an Army commander for combat. In October of 1859, the abolitionist John Brown, hoping to incite a slave rebellion, had seized the federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry, Virginia. The War Department requested that Marines from Washington D.C be sent to respond as they were closer than any regular Army troops. The officer ordered to take charge was Brevet Colonel Robert E. Lee USA. Realizing that a quick assault was required, Lee ordered the officer in charge of the Marines, Lieutenant Israel Greene, to storm the building where Brown and his men were barricaded. Greene led the assault and ran Brown through with his sword. The sword however was Greene's dress Marmaluke sword rather than his service cutlass. The sword broke and Brown survived his wounds to be hanged; not before predicting that slavery would be purged from the United States with blood. It was not until sixty years later and the entry of the United

States into the First World War that Soldiers and Marines would once again fight jointly, on a major scale, against their Nation's foes.

### World War I

World War I, in all probability, represented a zenith of Army and Marine Corps joint operations that would not be duplicated until the last battle of World War II. Despite some initial misgivings on the part of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Major General George Barnett, on how the Marines were being used, the harmony between the Corps and the Army was at an all time high point.

Upon American entry into the war, the United States was faced with rapidly raising and training a large Army, while at the same time quickly sending forces to France. General Barnett realized that the traditional role of Marines, as expeditionary forces incident to a naval campaign, was not applicable to the war the United States was now fighting. The Corps, however, had significantly expanded in the years prior to World War I to provide expeditionary forces in the Caribbean and elsewhere. US entry into the war would also provide, in Barnett's view, an opportunity to allow the Corps to expand further. As the United States Army quickly assembled its first division for deployment to France, Barnett, borrowing from precedent established years before, offered a Marine regiment to sail with the first forces of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF). On May 29, 1917, in accordance with directions issued by the president, the



Secretary of the Navy directed the Major General Commandant to organize a force of Marines to be known as the Fifth Regiment of marines for service with the Army as a part of the first expedition to proceed to France...'.\*4

When the Army demurred on finding transport for the Marines, Barnett convinced the Navy to transport the Marines on naval shipping. The Fifth Marine Regiment, largely composed of seasoned veterans from the Phillipine and Carribean expeditions, sailed for France to join the AEF.

There was no doubt as to what was the command relationship between the regiment and the Army.. "... the Fifth Regiment was considered as being detached for service with the Army by direction of the President.\*5

In the beginning the Marines were assigned to guard lines of communication and supply points. This caused General Barnett some concern. Barnett voiced his concerns to both the Navy and War Departments. In his excellent article on the history of the Marines in France, Major Edwin N. McClellan USMC, quotes a letter from General Pershing, the commander of the AEF, to General Barnett concerning the Marines:

...the reasons of distributing them along our Lines of Communications...being a compliment to their high state of discipline and excellent soldierly appearance....I can assure you that as soon as our service of the rear troops arrive,... the Marines will be bought back ....and assigned to the duties they so much desire in the Second Regular Division.\*6

In the above letter, we can see how General Pershing intended to use the Marines assigned to the AEF, as an integral part of a larger Army unit.

Originally, it was Barnett's intention to raise a Marine Division to fight in France. However, this was not to be. Rapidly, however, the Fifth Marine Regiment was joined by the newly formed and trained Sixth Marine Regiment and Sixth Marine Machine Gun Battalion. Upon the appointment of Colonel Charles Doyen, the commander of the Fifth Marines, as a Brigadier General, the Marine units were formed into the Fourth Marine Brigade, United States Marines, under Brigadier General Doyen. They were assigned as one of the brigades of the newly formed Second Division. In fact, for two weeks of October/November 1917, General Doyen USMC was assigned as the first division commander of the Second Division, pending the arrival of Major General Bundy USA. It is clear that internecine service rivalry, was from the beginning, minimized in the AEF.

From November 1917 until May 1918, the Fourth Marine Brigade, as part of the Army's Second Division, trained in France for the coming fury. In late May of 1918, Brigadier General Doyen became seriously ill and was returned to the United States. He was to die a few short months later. In the meanwhile, there was no Marine brigadier general to command the Brigade. Sailing in late May for France was Brigadier General John A. Lejuene USMC. A new commander was needed for the Brigade prior to his arrival.

Turning to his own chief of staff, Brigadier General James G. Harbord USA, General Pershing assigned him to command the Brigade of Marines. In his excellent book of reminiscences, Leaves From A War Diary, Harbord recalls his feelings on assuming command of the Marine Brigade. The commanders of the two regiments, Colonel Neville of the Fifth Marine Regiment and Colonel Catlin of the Sixth Marine Regiment, were hard bitten professional Marines who had each been awarded the Medal of Honor. Despite having attended the Army War College with Colonel Catlin in 1916-1917, Harbord knew he was in a delicate situation. Any trepidations he had were dispelled when as in Harbord's own words; "Colonel Neville said the motto of the Marines was 'Semper Fidelis' and that I could depend on them."

Two weeks after assuming command on 6 May 1917, Harbord and his Brigade of Marines were ordered into the line. The mission of the Second Division was to defend against a German offensive near the Marne River. The Second Division was to fight as part of a French Corps. Near the town of Torcy, the Germans, their offensive halted, occupied a wood known as Boise de Belleau. Harbord's Marine Brigade on 6 June was designated as the main attack to reduce the German salient.

The actions of the Marines in Belleau Wood became a legend. Attacking, with heavy casualties, as part of the Second Division, the Marines drove the Germans from the field. It

took twenty days of hard often hand to hand fighting. ' On June 26, 1918 a Major of Marines [sent] in his famous message: 'Woods now U.S. Marine Corps entirely.'\* It was, unfortunately, in Belleau Woods that the seeds of discord would be sown between the Army and the Corps that would last down to today.

The AEF had throughout the war enforced a strict censorship on all news reports coming from the front. Not only were units not identified but neither were services allowed to be mentioned in dispatches by the censors. During the battle of Belleau Wood, a newspaper reporter named Floyd Gibbons accompanied the Marine Brigade. Gibbons was severely wounded during the battle and a kindly censor, thinking Gibbons' wound was mortal, allowed his dispatch to go through unedited. Gibbons clearly identified the Marine Brigade. Overnight the Marines became the heroes of the Nation and the darlings of the French public. It was a public relations bonanza that would cost the Corps dearly. Barnett had continued to expand the Corps to attain his goal of a Marine Division in France. ' The War Department , however, knew that Pershing, probably miffed by the 4th Brigade's publicity.....would not incorporate the new brigade into a combat division.\* As a result only the Fourth Brigade of Marines participated in the war.

In William Manchester's biography of General Douglas MacArthur he relates how MacArthur, in World War II, personally excluded the Fourth Marine Regiment from the unit awards list

for actions in the Philippines because; ' the Marines had enough glory in World War I.'<sup>10</sup>

Shortly after the battle of Belleau Wood, General Harbord was assigned as the Commanding General of the Second Division and Colonel Neville was assigned to command the Marine Brigade. It was a difficult leave taking for both General Harbord and the Marines of the Brigade.

'He[Harbord] had come to love the globe and anchor on his collar as dearly as his crossed sabers of the cavalry. The... farewell from several hundred Marines to the strains of the Marine Hymn played by the 6th Marine Band was indeed a moving tribute.'<sup>11</sup>

Again the Second Division was hurled at the Germans in the vicinity of Soissons. The Marine Brigade continued to fight with the division during July of 1918.

In defense of General Pershing and the AEF, however, the role of Major General John A. Lejuene USMC must be mentioned. Arriving in France in June of 1918, Lejuene was not initially assigned. He hoped of course, to obtain command of the Marine Brigade. Despite his probable ire at the Corps, Pershing's ire did not extend personally to Lejuene. Lejuene had been a member of the Army War College class of 1910 and was held in high esteem by senior members of the Army. Speaking of his tenure at the War College, Lejuene had this to say in his memoirs: "...it had a far-reaching effect in giving me a standing among Army officers which stood me in good stead when I arrived in France during the World War, unattached,

and without a command.<sup>12</sup>

Brigadier General Lejuene arrived to assume command of the Brigade of Marines on 26 July, 1918. It would be a short command. Three days later, Lejuene was ordered to relieve General Harbord as the Commanding General of the Second Division. Pershing had recalled Harbord to put him in charge of the monumental logistical effort confronting the AEF.

Lejuene commanded the Division for the remainder of the war. Through the battles of Mont Blanc, St. Mihiel, and the Meuse-Argonne, the Second Division fought, often as part of a French Army, with no concern about the Marine in command of the division or the Marine Brigade as one of its integral brigades. After the cessation of hostilities, the Brigade remained a part of the Second Division in the occupation of the Rhineland. In August of 1919, after arrival in the United States, the Fourth Brigade was detached from the Army and returned to the Naval Service.

Writing in the Naval Institute Proceedings, ten years after the war, Captain John Thomason summed up the history of the Marines in World War I. "its [the Marines] history is the history of the American 2nd Division and they all [Marine and Army units] write the same names on their battle flags."<sup>13</sup>

#### THE INTER-WAR YEARS

The history of joint Marine Corps/ Army operations mirrors the history of the war in the Pacific. There was an evolution of command relationships that developed as the war was fought. This evolution did not occur in a vacuum. It is important to view some prewar developments in order to understand the developing operational relationship during World War II.

During the inter-war years the Marines had been involved in what today would be called peacemaking operations in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and China. At the same time the Corps, in accordance with its naval character, turned its attention to the development of doctrine to seize and secure advance naval bases. A Lieutenant Colonel by the name of Earl Ellis travelled extensively in Japanese controlled areas of the Pacific in the 1920's and wrote a prescient series of reports predicting both the war in the Pacific and the necessity to prepare for amphibious warfare to fight the war. <sup>14</sup>

Ellis' message was not lost on the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Major General John A. Lejeune. Lejeune lobbied the Joint Board of the Army and Navy, the precursor of the Joint Staff, to assign to the Marine Corps the role of seizing advanced naval bases. In 1927, the Joint Board of the Army and Navy gave the Corps the responsibility to provide and maintain forces for the initial seizure of advanced bases and for such limited auxiliary land operations as are essential to the prosecution of the naval

campaign.' ' 18

By 1935, after conducting training operations in the Caribbean and suspending regular work at Marine Corps Schools in Quantico to allow officers to concentrate on the problem of advance base seizure, the Corps had produced a manual on landing operations. In addition, under Navy auspices, special landing craft had been developed to land troops. When the United States entered World War II, the Marine Corps was the repository of the nascent amphibious doctrine of the United States armed forces.<sup>1\*</sup>

The Second World War saw an evolution of joint Marine Corps and Army operations that mirrored the evolution and refinement of amphibious operation doctrine. However, this evolution was not a smooth and easy growth bereft of inter-service squabbles. The minor inter-service rivalries of the Great War were not an indicator of some of the difficulties that would beset the Corps and the Army as they fought side by side in the Pacific.

It was no accident that the Army was designated to conduct all of the amphibious operations in Europe, while the Marine Corps and the Army were to share in the fight against Japan in the Pacific. In 1941 joint amphibious operations were conducted off the coast of North Carolina and as a result, the General Staff concluded that the use of a Marine Corps-Army amphibious corps was an organizational nightmare.... Arguing that Atlantic Ocean amphibious operations were simply preludes to the Army's



reconquest of Europe . . . . Army planners recommended that the Fleet Marine Force shift all its units to the Pacific.' 17

The conventional belief among the staffs of all the Services was that the operations in the Pacific would be self contained and of limited duration and therefore there would be no requirement to form joint landing forces. One Service or the other could be assigned the mission. The staffs were mistaken.

## WORLD WAR II

The United States strategy for the war in the Pacific was built around what we would today call two theaters of operations in one theater of war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff divided the Pacific theater of war into the Southwest Pacific Area commanded by General Douglas MacArthur. The Pacific Oceans Area theater of operations was to be commanded by Admiral Chester Nimitz. In essence, there would be two axis of advance in the Pacific. MacArthur would move through New Guinea to the Philippines while Nimitz reduced the Japanese held islands in the Pacific. Their actions were to be coordinated to place the Japanese on the defensive simultaneously. As the strategy evolved so did joint operations. In order to view that evolution we will briefly examine several operations in the Pacific.

Guadalcanal was the first land attack against the Japanese and Okinawa was the last. As disparate as these battles were in size and location, so were they poles apart in how the Services were employed and the relationships

between the Marine Corps and the Army. In between these two battles was a painful growth in how joint Army/ Marine Corps operations were to be conducted. In addition we will briefly examine one singular event that put a pall on relations between the Marines and Soldiers in the Pacific and has implications for today.

On August 7, 1942 the American offensive began with the landings of the First Marine Division on the island of Guadalcanal. Their objective was to capture a Japanese airfield and to secure the island for further use by American land based aircraft. Guadalcanal would be a bloody and desperate struggle in which many key lessons in amphibious assault would be learned. Major General A.A. Vandegrift's Marines fought a lengthy and bloody fight against the Japanese on the island while the Navy tried to interdict Japanese reinforcements. Time and time again the Marines fought off Japanese attacks on their perimeter. Slowly and at great cost the First Marine Division expanded their perimeter. In October the Army's 164th Infantry Regiment was landed on the island despite, the misgivings of the Army staff in 1941 of ever placing soldiers under a Marine commander.<sup>1\*</sup> Vandegrift used the regiment to reinforce his division and break the back of the Japanese final offensive. Plans were underway to replace the Marines on Guadalcanal with two Army Divisions and to place the force under Army command. In December, Major General Alexander Patch, who commanded the Americal Division,

assumed command of the island of Guadalcanal and was given the unenviable task of wiping out the last vestiges of Japanese resistance. Patch was given a force that consisted of two Army divisions and the Marine Corps' Second Division.

The Second Division fought alongside the two Army divisions until February of 1943, when Guadalcanal was at last declared to be secure. There were two outgrowths of Guadalcanal. On the doctrinal level, the Navy's departure from the objective area as well as Admiral Turner, the Navy commander's, interference in the tactical situation ashore, resulted in refinements to amphibious doctrine. On the operational level the idea of sequencing of forces gained favor. The conventional wisdom was that the Corps should conduct the initial assault and that Army units should then follow the assault to conduct sustained operations after the relief of the Marines. Writing after the war this view was subscribed to by General Vandegrift in his memoirs.

The course of the war had already confirmed our prewar belief that Marines should assault with the Army following to fight the sustained land warfare effort. In everything from organization to arms, equipment and philosophy the two services stood distinctly tailored for those roles. Decades of expeditionary service plus intense study and experiments in amphibious war stood behind the Marine concept of moving out fast and striking hard. We reasoned that acceptance of early casualties meant lighter casualties in the long run. The Army did not.<sup>10</sup>

The above quotation shows that the growth of joint operational expertise was not high on General Vandegrift's

list of priorities. In fairness to him though, it must be pointed out that his memoirs were penned not only after the war, but after the bruising service unification battles of 1946-1947 in which Vandegrift played a key role in the survival of the Marine Corps. Vandegrift's statement is a fair assessment of joint doctrinal thinking after the Guadalcanal campaign. Operations involving Marine and Army forces should be sequenced rather than truly joint. The joint operations of the Americal, 25th Infantry Division and the Second Marine Division were viewed as an anomaly rather than a precursor. Inter-service rivalry was beginning to rear its ugly head. Command relationships began to dominate service thinking while force levels were driving operational planning. Service parochialism was not just limited to the Army and the Marine Corps. The Navy and the Army Air Forces all had strong ideas on how the war in the Pacific should be organized and fought. That ... disputes arose was not surprising. Four different services (Navy, Marine Corps, Army and Army Air Corps) were attempting to carry out a novel type of operation (amphibious operations conducted other than by the Naval Department) which none of them had fully anticipated before the war. Success would require an unprecedented degree of coordination and cooperation.... That kind of cooperation did not come easily.<sup>20</sup>

Because of the paucity of Army divisions available to support MacArthur in his drive in the South Pacific, the First Marine Division, after its withdrawal from

Guadalcanal, was transferred to MacArthur's command for amphibious operations in New Britain. Throughout both the South and Central Pacific, Army and Marine forces were assigned and reassigned to conduct operations. In the landings on Bougainville in November of 1943 the pattern of using the Marines (the 3d Marine Division) to conduct the initial assault, followed by Army divisions to conduct the sustained operation ashore was repeated. In the New Britain campaign the First Marine Division secured the island of Cape Gloucester. This was the beginning of a second refinement in joint Army/Marine Corps operations. Separate island objectives would be given to Army and Marine Corps landing forces in the same operation. At the conclusion of this battle a controversy arose over the assignment of the Marine division. MacArthur did not want to return it to Nimitz's control. He intended to retain the division for his operations in the South Pacific at Rabaul. This sent the Corps into fits as they were in the midst of planning for operations in the Marianas and the first objective would be Saipan. Eventually, the landing on Rabaul would be canceled, but inter-service rivalry at the highest levels was intensified. On Saipan it would ignite!

As a prelude to Saipan, the atoll islands of Tarawa and Makin in the Gilbert islands had to be reduced. A new organization was created in the Central Pacific-the V Amphibious Corps. Selected to command the organization was a mercurial Marine partisan by the name of Holland M. Smith.

His nickname of Howling Mad was not without foundations. Headquarters cautioned Smith to work harmoniously with both the Army and the Navy. Smith was not disposed to do so if it meant compromising his standards for a successful amphibious operation.<sup>21</sup> Smith made no secret of his feelings that: "Army divisions did not assault defended islands with the proper elan. The army's tactics unnecessarily subjected the Navy's forces to attack by enemy air and submarine. In any amphibious operation, speed was of the essence, even if infantry casualties in the early stages of the operation were heavy. Smith....doubted the Army appreciated the problem."<sup>22</sup>

In the Gilberts, due to the necessity of conducting simultaneous and mutually supporting attacks, the Guadalcanal strategy of sequencing an amphibious operation was modified. The two divisions in the V Amphibious Corps were to attack their objectives simultaneously, Tarawa for the Second Marine Division and Makin for the 27th Infantry Division. Interestingly enough the V Amphibious Corps Commander was Holland Smith, the 2d Marine Division Commander Was MajGen Julian Smith, and the commander of the 27th Infantry Division was MajGen Ralph Smith. None were related. Despite the same patronymic, Marine Smith and Army Smith did not share feelings of brotherly love. The slow seizure of lightly held Makin island by the 27th Division infuriated Holland Smith. He felt that the division could quickly secure Makin, making it available to help crack the

tough nut that was Tarawa. 'Considering the size of the atoll, the nature of the enemy's defenses and the great superiority of force enjoyed by the attacking troops his criticism seems justified. '23

After the attacks in the Gilberts, the next objective was in the Marshalls. Again the Army and Marines were given separate island objectives to assault. The Army's veteran 7th Infantry Division reduced Kwajalein and the Marines seized Roi Namur. The seizure of Eniwetok, the next island in the Marshall chain, would involve a mixed landing force consisting of one regiment of Marines and the 106th Infantry of the 27th Division. Although not a large operation the differences in operational philosophy between the Army and the Marines became manifest once again as they operated jointly, vice assaulting their own separate island objectives. ' The command relationships deteriorated further because of honest differences of opinion about infantry tactics, ... the Marines tended to be less methodical or thorough in mopping up pockets of resistance. By pressing forward instead, Marine officers argued, the Marines eventually reduced casualties by disrupting the enemies organized defenses and spared the amphibious ships the danger of air and submarine attack. The Army on the other hand stressed methodical advances. '24

The next major joint amphibious operation would be in the Mariana Islands. Three islands would be captured: Tinian, Guam and Saipan. The war had entered a new phase.

Due to the size of the island objectives, sequencing or separation of Army and Marine forces was no longer feasible.

The objectives dictated multi-divisional joint landing forces. The lack of a common doctrinal base was about to sow the seeds of inter-service animosity.

On Saipan the assault force consisted of the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions with the Army's 27th Division in reserve, afloat. The initial assault met with resistance and due to Japanese fleet movements the Navy became anxious to commence general unloading of the assault troops. Initially on D+2 the 105th Regiment was brought ashore and attached to the 4th Marine Division. The next day the 27th Division landed in its entirety. General Holland Smith's plan called for a three division attack to seize an expanded beach head. The attack was slow and costly. General Ralph Smith's 27th Division was in the center between the two Marine Divisions. After two days of bloody fighting the landing force front was bowed in the center as the Army division was unable to progress at the same rate as the Marines. General Holland Smith, already unfavorably disposed towards the 27th Division, decided to relieve the Army commanding general. Thus was set in motion what has become known as the Smith vs Smith controversy. There were several extenuating circumstances for the slow progress of the 27th Division. No matter what the extenuating circumstances were-and there were several- the conclusion seems inescapable the Holland Smith had good reason to be disappointed with the



performance of the 27th Infantry Division....Whether the action he took to remedy the situation was a wise one, however, remains doubtful.<sup>25</sup> The damage done to inter-service relationships by the Smith controversy were incalculable. The Army determined that, after the current Marianas campaign was concluded, Army divisions would not fight under a Marine commander.

If at the service level, inter-service cooperation was grievously damaged, on the operational level cooperation continued. From Saipan it was possible to bombard by artillery the next objective, the island of Tinian. Although all the landing forces were Marines, the Army's XXIV Corps artillery, firing from Saipan, gave vital supporting arms support to the leathernecks ashore.

In contrast to the relationship between the Smiths, the last island attack in the Marianas-Guam, was not fraught with inter-service rivalry. III Amphibious Corps, the unit to seize Guam, was almost a mirror image of Smith's V Corps. A Marine Division and Provisional Brigade and an Army Division, the 77th Infantry Division, were commanded by MajGen Roy S. Geiger USMC. The plan called for the assault by the Marines with the Army division in reserve; almost a mirror image of the Saipan invasion. Once committed the 77th Division fought on the flank of the 3d Marine Division, and unlike Saipan, the cooperation between leathernecks and soldiers was superb. Slowly and grudgingly, despite the Smith controversy, the Army, Navy and Marine Corps came to

the realization that 'Perhaps more than any other type of warfare, amphibious operations require a harmony of action.... Land, sea, and air forces must be combined in the proper quantities, time and place...By the summer of 1944, the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps had sufficient experience in joint operations to be optimistic about the success of future landings in the Pacific.'<sup>26</sup>

The harmony of action that Crowl mentions was dictated as much by necessity as by desire. In MacArthur's campaign to retake the Philippines, Marine forces provided fire support that was critical to the campaign. Repaying the debt owed to the XXIV Corps artillery, Marine artillery battalions were transferred to Army control for the Leyte landings. It was Marine aviation that provided the significant increase in combat power that the chief of MacArthur's air forces, Lieutenant General George Kenney, needed so desperately. Flying in support of MacArthur's soldiers the Marines provided the majority of the close air support for the soldiers liberating the Philippines. The Marines' reliance on, and enthusiasm for, close air support spread to the Army. 'If anything, the Army's enthusiasm for close air support became excessive, and many ground units saw Marine aviation as a solution for every tactical problem.'<sup>27</sup>

With the seizure of the Philippines and the Marine Corps seizure of Iwo Jima, the stage was set for the next landing, which would be on a Japanese home island. Operation Iceberg, the seizure of Okinawa, would prove to be

the epitome of joint service cooperation not only in the Second World War, but arguably in American military history.

The Okinawan campaign would be different in scope than any other operation previously attempted in the Pacific War. 'The command relationships, which had hitherto been prescribed in the Central Pacific for the seizure of small land areas far removed from Japan required modification for the Okinawa campaign. ...the establishment of one or more positions in the Ryukyus (the island chain of which Okinawa was a part) called for the employment of a field army.'<sup>22</sup> The force was organized in a manner that would be right in line with the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols). The Commander of the Fifth Fleet, Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, was designated as the commander of the operation. Subordinate to him for the amphibious phase of the operation was Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner USA, commanding Tenth Army. Buckner's Army consisted of two corps, one Army and one Marine. The Army's XXIV Corps was commanded by Major General John R. Hodge and initially consisted of the 7th and 96th Divisions. Eventually, the Corps would grow to include the 77th and 27th Infantry Divisions. The III Marine Amphibious Corps (III MAC), commanded by Major General Roy Geiger USMC, consisted of the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions. The 2d Marine Division was originally assigned to Buckner only for the purpose of conducting a demonstration landing. After accomplishing its mission the division returned to the island of Saipan.

Buckner's plan called for the landing of two corps, consisting of two divisions each, side by side across the landing beaches. In scope the Okinawa operation resembled Normandy more than the previous battles in the Pacific. In an innovative command arrangement that would be a forerunner of current joint doctrine, Buckner appointed Major General Francis Mulcahy USMC, to command the tactical air forces of the Army Air Forces and Marine aviation supporting the operation. In addition he was able to task naval aviation to support the campaign. This tasking and coordination authority made Mulcahy the first functional Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). This concept is an integral part of today's joint warfighting doctrine.

Unlike previous Pacific operations, Okinawa did not permit separate Army or Marine objectives or the sequencing of forces. III MAC fought as an integral part of the Tenth Army and General Buckner used his command authority to good advantage.

On Okinawa, the Japanese plan of defense was to let the Americans land unopposed. Japanese forces would defend the southern and militarily important part of the island. Concurrently, the Japanese planned large scale suicide plane and small boat attacks on the American battle fleet. On April 1, 1945 the Marines and Soldiers of the landing force walked ashore virtually unopposed. By the middle of April 1945, the northern half of the island had been secured, with little resistance, by III MAC. The Army on the

other hand was banging up against the main Japanese defensive line in the south. Because the Marines were meeting little resistance in the north, General Buckner ordered Major General Geiger, to put most of his artillery under the command of XXIV Corps artillery. The Marine cannoners fell in under the Army artillery command structure and reinforced the Army artillery trying to crack the Japanese defenses. By the end of April it became apparent to Buckner that the only way to break the Japanese defenses was to attack with all his available forces. To this end he planned to conduct a two corps attack abreast south, with the Marines on the west and the Army corps on the eastern side of the island. In order to prepare for the attack, Buckner ordered Geiger to attach the First Marine Division to the XXIV Corps to relieve the badly bloodied 27th Infantry Division. From 30 April until the 6th of May, the First Marine Division fought as an integral part of the Army Corps. Buckner then ordered Geiger to assume control of the division and conduct a Corps sized attack south in conjunction with the Army Corps on his left flank. Shoulder to shoulder the two corps of Tenth Army, one Army one Marine, pushed southward against the determined Japanese defenses. Overhead Army Air Force, Marine and Naval aircraft provided close air support. Slowly but surely the Japanese defenses were attrited. On June 18th, while watching a Marine attack, General Buckner was fatally wounded. Geiger assumed command of Tenth Army. Despite

General Buckner's express desire to have Geiger succeed to command of Tenth Army for the rest of the operation: "For various reasons, political and otherwise, the Army sent General Joseph W. Stillwell, USA, former deputy commander of the Southeast Asia Command-who had been on his way back to the States when intercepted while en route-to Okinawa...." On 23 June General Joseph Stillwell USA arrived to relieve Geiger of command of the Tenth Army. The legacy of Smith vs. Smith was still alive. The Army, it would seem, despite the superb inter-service cooperation on Okinawa, was concerned about a Marine commanding Army troops. By 2 July 1945, Okinawa was secure. Its lessons, however would not be enshrined as joint service doctrine.

The final evaluation of the Okinawa campaign was best written by Isley and Crowl; "...there were no serious 'incidents' such as occurred on Saipan to mar the picture of cooperation. Army artillery supported marine infantry and vice versa; marine and army planes were used interchangeably and operated under the same tactical command; on the southern line each contiguous infantry unit was mutually supporting and interdependent.... To those who would... emphasize the areas of friction among men and units wearing different uniforms of the United States, Okinawa stands as indisputable proof that joint operations were successful."

With the successful conclusion of the Second World War,

the United States went through a major demobilization. At the same time in 1946-1947, the newly organized Department of Defense went through a bruising battle among the services on roles and missions and service unification. The lessons of Okinawa on joint service cooperation were largely buried in the venomous atmosphere of inter-service rivalry. Those lessons would have to be relearned in an obscure place called Korea.

### THE KOREAN WAR

On June 25th 1950, the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) surged across the border into South Korea precipitating American participation in the Korean War. We will look at the joint Army-Marine Corps aspects of that war during three periods; the defense of the Pusan perimeter, the Inchon -Seoul Campaign, and the retreat back to the 38th parallel after Chinese intervention. One characteristic seems to be the common thread during these periods. The Marine forces successfully fought as components of Army commands. To a degree, the command and joint relationships were characteristic of the Okinawa campaign, even though at Inchon and the Chosin Reservoir, the personal relationships were more a semblance of Saipan.

By the end of July 1950, the United Nations forces had been pushed into a defensive perimeter around the southern South Korea city of Pusan. Lieutenant General Walton

Walker, in command of the Eighth Army was desperate for reinforcements to hold the perimeter. The 24th Division and the 1st Cavalry division needed support or the perimeter around Pusan would collapse. On 1 August 1950 the first elements of the 2d Infantry Division, of World War I fame, and the First Provisional Marine Brigade began to debark in Pusan.

The arrival of the Marine Brigade was especially critical. The brigade consisted not only of a large infantry regiment, the Fifth Marines, but a large Marine Air Group. The Marines had not been subject, as had the Army, to internal or external criticism of their training methods in the inter-war years. The Doolittle Commission that had looked at Army training had made recommendations for changes in the Army that had severely curtailed the intensity of combat training and lessened discipline. As a result of the Marine Corps unimpeded ability to continue to use tough training methods, and the call up of the Marine Reserve, the Brigade consisted of tough veteran officers and NCOs and well trained troops vice ill trained draftees. The brigade provided real muscle. Commanded by Brigadier General Edward A. Craig... it had a strength of 6500 men and could enter the fight with M-26 Pershing tanks which, with their 90 mm guns, were more than a match for the T-34. This force saved the day in the south and stopped the enemy dead in its tracks.<sup>31</sup> In order to restore the perimeter, General Walker formed Task Force Kean, consisting of three



army regiments and the newly arrived Marine Brigade. The commander was Major General Bill Kean USA, the commander of the 25th Division. General Kean was in a desperate fight. In the course of the battle he placed the Army's 5th RCT under the control of the Marine Brigade, just as the Brigade had been placed under the control of the Eighth Army. From the 6th to the 12th of August Task Force Kean fought back the enemy salient. Marine F4U Corsairs flying from two small carriers provided responsive close air support to leatherneck and soldier alike. Whereas Army regiments, (other than those fighting with Marines) still had to request F(ar) E(ast) A(ir) F(orces) close air support through a complicated, slow, and unsatisfactory chain of command, the marines had support aircraft close at hand and virtually on instant call.<sup>32</sup> Walker needed a unit that he could move into the defensive perimeter to prevent a breakthrough. Walker decided to use the Marine Brigade as a fire brigade, rushing them into the line to conduct counter attacks wherever the enemy threatened to break through the American lines. Marine and Army units fought together with virtually no problems of inter-operability.

During the last days of August and the beginning of September 1950, the Marine Brigade was in support of three different Army divisions. The tactical employment of the Brigade by the 2d Infantry division in a counter-attack against the NKPA along the Naktong River, typifies the way joint combat with so many different units was conducted.

The planning conference for the projected counterattack began at 1430 in the 2d Division CP... General Keiser (2d Division CG) emphasize the gravity of the situation in the 2d Division sector. They wanted Craig to counterattack that afternoon on a wide front... He (Craig) did not wish to commit his force piecemeal without air superiority; and in the end, the Army staff officers agreed with him.... He (Craig) suggested that the 2d Division specify the Marine objectives and allow him to attack in such formations as he deemed most effective. Keiser and his staff assented. "3

By issuing the Marines mission type orders, the Army division commanders were able to quickly deploy the Marine forces placed under their tactical control. The Marines ,however, would not remain much longer in the perimeter.

Much to his frustration, and against his professional judgement Walker was about to lose the Marines. As early as July 1950, MacArthur had settled on an amphibious landing at Inchon as the stroke needed to destroy the NKPA. He formed the X Corps under his chief of staff Major General Edward Almond USA. The Army's 7th Infantry Division and the Marine Corps' 1st Marine Division were designated to conduct the assault. Major General O.P. Smith, the Marine Division commander, insisted that he needed the First Brigade's Fifth Regiment to make the landing. Over Walker's objections on 5 September 1950, the Marines were withdrawn from the Pusan perimeter to join their parent division for the September 15th landing at Inchon.

MacArthur's plan for the landing at Inchon was relatively simple. Inchon had numerous hydrographic disadvantages such as tides, lack of suitable landing

beaches and narrow approaches to the objective area. These factors among others caused MacArthur to plan to land the landing force sequentially. The Marines would land first to secure the port of Inchon and the airfield at Kimpo. The 7th Division under Major General David Barr USA would land after the port was secure and screen the Marines' right flank and establish blocking positions south of Seoul.

Unfortunately, the personal relationships in X Corps would more closely resemble Saipan than Okinawa. O.P. Smith was the antithesis of the H.M. Smith. Even tempered and calm, he chafed under General Almond's insistence that Seoul be liberated by 25 September, the 3d month anniversary of the NKPA attack. Smith was not alone in his dislike of Almond. 'Dave Barr... got on no better with Almond than did Marine General O.P. Smith. Barr was highly annoyed by Almond's driving intensity, dictatorial manner, and brashness and had ...doubts about his battlefield competence.'<sup>34</sup> Smith in the interest of the mission never raised the fact that he was senior to Almond.

Smith and Almond were at loggerheads over tactics. Almond wanted speedy progress and Smith wanted to commit his forces in coordinated attacks. Finally, when the 1st Marine Division was held up by fierce fighting on the outskirts of Seoul, Almond ordered the 7th Division to attack into the city. The good relations and coordination between Barr and Smith ensured that what could have been a disaster of fratricide was a mutually supporting attack. After several

days of bitter house to house fighting, and despite General Almond's 25 September proclamation that Seoul was secure, on 28 September most organized resistance ended.

With the collapse of the NKPA MacArthur formulated a strategy that would lead to disaster. He split his force, placing Eighth Army in the western half of Korea, and after an unnecessary sea movement, he placed X Corps on the eastern coast. The X Corps attacked north into North Korea to a place called the Chosin Reservoir.

The Chinese intervention changed the nature of the war. The X Corps was forced to fall back, eventually to the port of Hungnam, to evacuate North Korea. A little known fact is that the coordination between the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division was essential in this retreat in the face of enemy pressure. This is not to imply that the withdrawal from Chosin was a smooth military operation. Many units were forced to fight for themselves and in one unhappy incident General Smith had to refuse a request to send a tank infantry team to link up with an Army regiment attempting to break out. Smith's force was still fighting its way south. The Marines already in Hagaru had to hold that vital base and Smith had no forces to send in relief.<sup>35</sup> Marine air flew countless sorties in support of the Army regiment, but the Chinese overwhelmed them at night when close air support was less effective. Again a bitter dispute broke out between Smith and Almond. Almond wanted Smith to beat a hasty retreat and abandon equipment. Smith

determined to fight his way out with his equipment, his wounded and his dead. 36

In his memoirs of the war, General Matthew Ridgway found no fault with Smith. 'The 1st marine Division and two battalions of the 7th Division endured a...bitter experience. But again, thanks to courageous leadership and the extreme forethought of General Smith, complete disaster was averted.' 37

For the rest of the Korean War, the Marines fought as part of an Army Corps. The Marine air wing provided air support not only to Marines, but every division in the Eighth Army, as well as participating in strategic strikes against targets in North Korea. Conversely, the Marines were glad to have the general support artillery of the X Corps available to reinforce their direct support artillery. During the 'stalemate' of the war during 1951-1953, the Marines were able to fully integrate their defensive operations with those of the Army divisions assigned to their flanks. As the Korean War drew to a close, the close cooperation in joint operations between Marines and soldiers would fade from current memory.

#### GRENADA

Operation Urgent Fury, the invasion of Grenada, by the United States in October 1983, has been held up as a textbook example of what was wrong with the military forces of the United States. Despite the accomplishment of the mission critics have charged that this operation clearly

illuminated how unprepared we were to fight a joint operation.<sup>30</sup> Many, most notably the congressional military reform caucus, led by then Senator Gary Hart, pointed to the operation in Grenada as proof that the command structure and doctrine of the armed forces needed radical reform. In no small part Grenada was an additional impetus to the Goldwater Nichols Act to reform the military.

In point of fact much of the criticism directed at the planning of the operation is unjustified when the time-line available for planning and conducting the operation is considered. From receipt of the warning order to the United States Atlantic Command (Lantcom) on 19 October, to execution on 25 October the entire scope and mission was changed. Initially Lantcom was instructed to prepare a non-combatant emergency evacuation operation (NEO) of American citizens. In the interim six day period the mission was changed to invasion and installation of a Caribbean peace keeping force. The criticism about the lack of intelligence, over compartmentalization of the operation, the creation of an ad hoc Joint Task Force to command the operation, lack of joint representation on the JTF, and the creation of the operational plan within the Pentagon is valid.<sup>31</sup>

Three separate entities; the Amphibious Ready Group, the Army Rangers, and the 82d Airborne Division all became involved with formulating different plans. The newly formed Joint Special Operations Command formulated a plan based on Army Rangers. The 82d Airborne Division formulated a plan

based on their projected mission and the Amphibious Ready Group formulated a plan based on the use of Navy/Marine forces. All of this was occurring within a six day time frame with rapidly changing mission parameters. It featured a 'come as you are' scenario typified by critical, time-sensitive mission requirements; minimal planning; employment of joint and combined forces; incomplete intelligence; command control and communication intensity; and high political visibility. <sup>40</sup>

What is essential for the purpose of examining the joint operations of the Army and the Marine Corps is to look at the final plan promulgated by the JCS and then briefly examine the plan's execution. For our purposes we will include the Army Rangers, who were actually part of JSOC, as Army participants in the operation.

The original plan called for the Marine Battalion, supported by the helicopter squadron organic to the Marine Amphibious Unit, to seize the airport at Pearl and the town of Grenville in the northern part of the island. In the south the Ranger Regiment would seize the airfield at Salines and the towns of Calvigny and True Blue. In phase two on D+1 the 82d Airborne Division would follow up and relieve the Marines and special forces units. The island had been divided in half with the Marines in the North and the Army in the South. The Army, of course was concerned the plan...did not seem to envisage a ground force commander on the island. <sup>41</sup>

The operation did not go according to plan. Murphy's law, aided and abetted by a faulty command structure and lack of intelligence and assisted by weather began to operate in spades. The Marines met very little resistance and quickly secured their D-Day objectives. The Rangers, met with heavier resistance than anticipated. Weather at Pope Air Force Base delayed the departure of the 82d Airborne. Additionally, a large number of the American medical students, whose evacuation was a primary stated mission, were located at a separate campus in Grand Anse and not in Salinas.

By 1200 on D-day, it became apparent that the Rangers would require additional fire support. The JTF commander, Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, ordered Marine Cobra gunships flying off the amphibious ships to provide the Rangers with close in fire support. The cobras engaged the forces of the People's Revolutionary Army at the cost of two helicopters and three lives. In the face of continuing enemy resistance, Admiral Metcalf made the decision, by early afternoon D-Day, to land the Marines into the Army sector in the vicinity of St. George's. This move would reassign some of the Army objectives to the Marines. A boundary change was effected to accommodate the arrival of the Marines.' 42

On D+1 the lack of intelligence on the location of all the American citizen students became critical. The discovery of the second campus at Grand Anse required radical action.



The JTF commander, because of the paucity of Army aviation units, directed that a heliborne assault would be conducted into Grand Anse by a Ranger battalion lifted in Marine Corps helicopters. Neither the Ranger Regimental commander or the Marine Expeditionary Unit commander were happy about conducting a joint operation of this magnitude on the fly. As circumstances would have it the commanders of the Marine helicopter squadron and the Ranger battalion had been classmates at Virginia Military Institute. Once again the old school tie became an instrument of inter-service cooperation.

Sharing a Marine UH-1 helicopter for command and control the two commanders executed a successful evacuation of the students under hostile fire. For the next five days the Army forces, reinforced by the 82d Airborne, and the Marines continued to clear their zones of the PRA and Cuban construction workers while facilitating the assumption of police duties by troops from Caribbean nations. On D+6 the Marines backloaded and conducted a Naval force only operation on Carriacou island north of Grenada. They met no resistance and captured a large cache of weapons. The next day the Marines departed for Lebanon, their original destination before they were diverted to Grenada.

Operation Urgent Fury can be characterized, especially in the first three days, as series of fire fights rather than a campaign. Despite justified criticism over the planning and command and control, the Army and Marines were

able to operate together tactically in a manner that has been unrecognized. There were certainly problems, but many were the result of the compressed planning cycle and not a lack of inter-service interoperability.

#### PANAMA

Operation Just Cause, the United States intervention in Panama, was the first joint Marine Corps/Army operation conducted after the Goldwater Nichols defense Reform Act. It was a joint operation from the Marine Corps and Army perspective only in that there was a common commander. The conduct of the operation does not really tell the story of the Army and Marines in Panama. During the operation the Army was divided into several task forces with their own missions and objectives. The Marine Corps forces were organized into Task Force Semper Fidelis and likewise were assigned their own tactical area of operations and objectives. A wire diagram of the operation would show that a Marine Forces Panama (MARFOR) component command was created under JTF South, commanded by Lieutenant General Carl Stiner, the commanding General of XVIII Airborne Corps. The actual conduct of the operation had the Marines operating on one side of the canal and the soldiers on the other side. The real joint Marine/Army story is in the months leading up to December 20, 1989 when Just Cause was conducted.

In the months preceding the decision to intervene militarily in Panama, the United States conducted diplomatic and military action short of war to try to unseat General

Manuel Noreiga's illegitimate government. On the military side additional forces were sent to improve security at American military sites and to exercise our rights under the Panama Canal treaty. These treaty right exercises were conducted under the command of Commander in Chief United States Southern Command (CINCSOUTH), who designated his Army component commander as JTF Panama to conduct operations in country.

Among the forces in Panama was a Marine Security Force Company under the operational control of the commanding officer of the United States Naval Base, Rodman. The commander of JTF Panama, Major General Bernard Loeffke USA, and his staff instantly had a culture clash with the Marines. Loeffke and his staff did not understand that the Marines were under the operational control of the Navy. In addition his Army staff "...out of necessity, filled most of these (JTF Panama staff) positions, thus imparting a distinctly greenish (Army) hue to a purple (joint) canvas."<sup>43</sup> To rectify the command and control problem as perceived by Loeffke and his staff and also because Marine combat forces were being assigned to increase security at Rodman, a MARFOR Panama was created at the direction of CINCSOUTH.

Loeffke emphasized joint training and operations to improve interoperability. There were, however, deep seated cultural differences between the Army and the Marines. The Marines were assigned to provide security to a petroleum

tank farm and ammunition storage area. As the war of nerves with the Panamanian defense forces escalated and armed intruders were entering the Marines security zones, conflict arose between the JTF commander and the Marines. The rules of engagement (ROE) and operational constraints promulgated by the JTF staff were anathema to the Marines. Given the recent memory of the Beirut bombing the Marines were extremely sensitive to force protection measures. 'MARFOR commanders argued that the ROE did not provide adequate protection for their men. The rules for warning trespassers, even armed intruders, left Marine guards vulnerable, the commanders protested....One MARFOR commander indicated that on most differences of opinion, the Marines and the Army could sit down and work out the problem. The controversy over operational constraints, however was the exception to that generalization.'44

Once again we can see the differences in mindset between Army and Marine officers that was prevalent in some campaigns during World War II. The actual conduct of combat operations in Panama was swift and rapidly concluded. The Marines in Task Force Semper Fidelis accomplished their mission of seizing and securing the Bridge of the Americas and seizing a PDF headquarters. The operation was widely spread actions by separate task forces. The prelude to combat, however, showed that when a staff is formed, and as in Grenada it is not 'purple' enough, problems can ensue. Less than one year later, half way around the world the Army

and Marine Corps would once again deploy to deter and then fight aggression.

#### DESERT SHIELD / DESERT STORM 45

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded its neighbor Kuwait and the United States response was rapid and effective. Ordered to move American forces to defend Saudi Arabia, the commander of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), quickly began the deployment of his assigned forces. Coincidentally, CENTCOM had just sponsored a war game, Internal Look, in which the component headquarters under CENTCOM's command had exercised a deployment of forces. Adapting an existing plan CINC CENT organized his theater with component commanders along service lines. The commander of the Third Army at Fort McPherson, Georgia was designated as Army Central Command (ARCENT). The commander of the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) was designated as Marine Forces Central Command (MARCENT). The CinC had deliberately chosen not to organize his forces under a single ground component commander for several reasons. Among these was the fact that this arrangement would probably not have been satisfactory to the non-NATO members of the coalition. In addition, the logical choice to perform that role, ARCENT, had additional theater wide responsibility for multi service logistical support. This former role was in accordance with U.S. doctrine and agreed upon plans formulated by CENTCOM. It would have been extremely difficult for ARCENT to take on the additional

role of even U.S. ground force commander. Another consideration was that the ARCENT staff could not have as it stood, adequately commanded and controlled a two division MEF with its organic air wing. A large staff augmentation would have been required to paint the ARCENT staff the hue of purple required to perform the mission of the land component commander. That augmentation would have had to have been taken out of hide from operational Marine units and headquarters.

The lack of unity of command, however, was not a detriment to unity of effort. The XVIII Airborne Corps and I MEF hit the ground together and established an effective and cohesive defensive plan. In one case, an Army aviation battallion sized task force, was placed under I MEF's operational control (OPCON), in order to give strength to the defense along a high speed avenue of approach.

Marine Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) teams were assigned to the XVIII Airborne Corps to provide Army maneuver battalions with Marine close air support.

Although at the operational unit level there were relatively few problems, at the component level cultural misunderstanding reared its head. For example, the Marine liaison officer to ARCENT provided daily force and readiness information, on Marines deployed in country, for the Commanding General of ARCENT. The focus of the information was on the combat power available to halt an Iraqi attack. Routinely the ARCENT operations officer removed all the

Marine fixed wing aircraft from the force list, ( a considerable portion of the MEF's combat power) under the guise that air should not be counted on, if it shows up it is a bonus. \* \*

At the war fighting level this attitude was not evident. ANGLICO assured their Army units that Marine fixed wing aircraft would be there in the close air support role and its action could and would be decisive against armored formations.

After the decision was made to shift from the defense to the offense, an offensive plan was developed to liberate Kuwait and to destroy the Iraqi Republican Guards. That plan called for the Marines to conduct a supporting attack into Kuwait while Army and coalition forces maneuvered wide around the Iraqi defenses to destroy the Iraqi army. Originally the two Marine division MEF was to have a third division (the 1st UK Armoured Division) assigned. Because of political considerations, the 1st Armoured was designated to become part of the main attack into Iraq. To partially improve the correlation of forces for the supporting attack, the CinC assigned the Tiger Brigade of the U.S. Army's Second Armored division to the MEF.

The Brigade was assigned OPCON (operational control) to the MEF. In a message to the CinC, ARCENT requested that the Brigade be sent TACON, a lesser form of command and control. It was a message that should never have been sent. MARCENT replied that the Marines did not intend to

piecemeal out the Brigade and that the concerns of the ARCENT staff were unjustified and unwarranted. The Brigade reported OPCON.

There were some logistical difficulties in the assignment of the Brigade. It was impossible for the Second Armored Division to break out the Brigade's 'slice' of combat service support without severely weakening the division's support. Without recrimination the logisticians of the division and the MEF quickly formulated a plan for logistical support that would work using a combination of Army and Marine Corps assets.

The MEF commander assigned the Brigade TACON to the Second Marine Division. The 2d Division was equipped with M1-A1 tanks and was heavily mechanized. The Brigade functioned as a separate maneuver element of the division. The Tiger Brigade's Multiple Launch Rocket System battery fell in under the 2d Division's artillery regiment. Initially in reserve until after the breach of the Iraqi obstacle belt, the Tiger Brigade quickly was passed through the lead Marine regiments and launched against the Iraqi forces withdrawing from Kuwait City. The complete destruction of the Iraqi forces north of Kuwait City, where the road passes through the Mitla Ridge, has been attributed to airpower alone. In point of fact, the Tiger Brigade maneuvered onto the left flank of the Iraqi column preventing them from moving laterally off the road and escaping into the desert. Throughout the short ground war



the Tiger Brigade fought as an integral part of a Marine division.

In the parade at Camp Pendleton, California, to welcome home I MEF, the MEF commander made it a point to ensure that the organizational color guard from the Tiger Brigade was present. Marines, who as we have seen, fought so many times as an integral part of Army combat organizations were sensitive to the Brigades feelings. In the aftermath of combat the single biggest debate among the Tiger Brigade was 'what combat patch are we supposed to wear?'

### CONCLUSIONS

The history of joint Marine Corps/Army operations is one that should be scanned by Soldier and Marine alike. Perhaps many of the bitter debates would subside as they realize that since the early Indian Wars they have fought side by side against the enemy.

One recurring theme throughout this history seems to be the importance of personal relationships. No wire diagram in the world can correct flawed or unprofessional relationships. This was apparent in the Gulf War. All of the component commanders agreed that it was their respect for each other that was one of the key components in the smooth functioning of American forces. They had decided to complement each other rather than compete with each other. The relationships of Lejuene and Harbord or Geiger and Buckner should be the one that is pursued, not Smith vs Smith. An element any service must consider in assigning commanders, even at the battalion level is, are

they capable of fighting jointly? On staffs, at the division and above, it is a prerequisite.

From Belleau Wood to Grenada the importance of the old school tie cannot be discounted. At the senior service school level a greater effort must be made to 'purple' the student body. Too many senior field grade officers are lacking in knowledge not only of the capabilities of the other services, but of the institutional culture that underlies their war fighting doctrine.

The future holds a smaller American military. Complementary capabilities rather than competing capabilities has to be the norm.

The nation cannot afford to maintain excessive redundant capabilities within the four Department of Defense Services.... Compositing a brigade of the 82d Airborne Division with a naval task force comprised of an amphibious and/or a carrier battle group and an Air Force composite wing, under a designated joint task force (JTF) headquarters, provides the basis for a truly rapid and affordable rapid-response force. We need to worry less about who commands and more about smooth integration.<sup>47</sup>

The history of joint Marine Corps/ Army operations shows us that given professionalism, the above is easily attainable and in the best interests of the soldier or Marine on the battlefield.

## ENDNOTES

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6. ibid., 346.
7. James G. Harbord, MajGen USA (Ret.), Leaves From a War Diary, ( New York: Mead & Company, 1926), 280.
8. McClellan, 350.
9. Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps, ( New York: McMillan Publishing Co.,Inc. 1980 ), 307.
10. William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1964, ( Boston: Little Brown & Co. 1978), 230. During the First World War, MacArthur was first the Chief of Staff of the 42nd (Rainbow) Division and then the Commanding General of the 84th Infantry Brigade. As Manchester makes clear MacArthur was vainglorious and perhaps chafed that the unit he commanded overseas in the Great War did not get the publicity and public adulation accorded to the Marine Brigade.
11. W. H. Edwards, ' Harbord and Lejuene: A Command Precedent', Marine Corps Gazette, vol. 37, no. 7, (July 1953): 15.
12. John A. Lejuene, MajGen USMC (Ret.), The Reminiscences of a Marine, (Philadelphia: Dorrance and Company, Publishers, 1930), 191.
13. John W. Thomason Jr., ' The Marine Brigade', U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 54, no. 11, (November 1928): 965.
14. Ellis died of mysterious circumstances on the

Japanese controlled island of Palau in 1923. There is considerable speculation that he was poisoned by the Japanese.

15. Robert J. Moskin, The U.S. Marine Corps Story, (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1987), 222.

16. The seminal work on the development of amphibious doctrine is Peter A. Isley, and Philip A. Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War: Its Theory, and Its Practice in the Pacific, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951).

17. Millett, 350.

18. See Millett, pp. 348-350 for a detailed discussion of the amphibious exercises and the doctrinal differences that led to this opinion of the Army staff.

19. A.A. Vandegrift, General USMC (Ret.), Once A Marine: The Memoirs of General A.A. Vandegrift, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1964) 243.

20. Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan, ( New York: Vintage Books, 1985), 258.

21. Millett, 392.

22. ibid. 393.

23. Philip A. Crowl, and Edmund G. Love, United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific: Siezure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, ( Washington D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History, 1985), 126.

24. Millett, 403.

25. Philip A. Crowl, United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific: Campaigns in the Marianas, (Washington D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History, 1985), 201. This work, in Chapter 8, contains an objective overview of the Smith vs. Smith controversy.

26. ibid., 446.

27. Millett, 426.

28. Charles S. Nicholas Jr., and Henry I. Shaw Jr., Okinawa: Victory in the Pacific, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), 17.

29. Benis M. Frank, Okinawa: The Great Island Battle, (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1978), 160.

30. Isley and Crowl, 578.

31. Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War, ( Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company Inc., 1967), 29.

32. Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953, (New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1987), 194.

33. Lynn Montrose, and Nicholas A. Canzona, The Pusan Perimeter, vol 1 of U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953, (Washington, D.C., Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, G-3 Historical Branch, 1954), 213.

34. Blair, 275.

35. An excellent work on the untold story of the 7th Division at the Chosin Reservoir is contained in; Roy E. Appleman, East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout: Korea 1950, (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1987).

36. Max Hasting, The Korean War, (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1987), contains a balanced account of the Almond vs Smith controversy.

37. Ridgway, 68.

38. See 'JCS Replies to Criticism of Grenada Operations', Army, vol. 34, no. 8, (August 1984), 28-37. This article contains a detailed rebuttal of the items criticized in the Congressional Military Reform Caucus report.

39. Mark Adkin, Urgent Fury: the Battle for Grenada, (Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath & Co., Lexington Books, 1989). This work contains details on the plans' formulation, assignment of forces and execution of the operation.

40. Michael J. Byron, ' Fury From the Sea: Marines in Grenada', U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 110, no.5, (May 1984), 120.

41. Adkins, 135.

42. Byron, 127.

43. Lawrence A. Yates, 'Joint Task Force Panama: Just Cause Before and After', Military Review, (October 1991), 61.

44. Yates, 64.

45. The author was assigned as the Marine liaison to ARCENT from 28 August 1990 to 5 October 1990. Subsequently,

he was the senior watch officer in the I MEF combat operations center until March 22, 1991. In these positions he was able to observe joint Army/Marine Corps operations. The opinions expressed in this section are the author's.

46. This statement was repeatedly made to the Marine Corps liaison officer to ARCENT during September and October 1990.

47. General Carl E. Mundy USMC, 'Part 1: Defining the Course', Marine Corps Gazette, vol. 75, no. 10, (October 1991), 13.

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